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INTO THE CLINICAL SETTING
ANGELA OLIVIA BURTON*
The exercise of judgment in legal decision-making and problem-
solving is inherently complex, requiring the lawyer to draw on a mul-
tiplicity of intellectual capacities. Although central to lawyering, the
development of independent professional judgment is not given ap-
preciable attention in the conventional law school curriculum. In-
deed, focusing almost exclusively on rule-based inductive, deductive,
and categorical reasoning processes and linguistic precision, tradi-
tional law school pedagogy neglects other kinds of intellectual activity
such as narrative, interpersonal, intrapersonal, and strategizing work,
all of which are essential to the exercise of sound legal judgment. This
disproportionate privileging of some lawyering intelligences over
other equally important ones has been shown to effectively desensi-
tize law students to personal and structural concerns that are critical
to the sort of broad-gauged, contextualized, and morally nuanced
judgment that is the hallmark of ethical and socially responsible
lawyering.
To counteract this tendency, this Article elaborates the concept of
"multiple lawyering intelligences, " a pedagogical construct designed
to expand our frame of reference for what it means to "think like a
lawyer." The lawyering intelligences framework names a range of
intellectual activities engaged in by lawyers across all kinds of legal
work, and includes logical-mathematical, linguistic, categorizing, nar-
rative, intrapersonal, interpersonal, and strategic intelligences. The
Article explores the ways in which conscious attention to the various
multiple lawyering intelligences can enhance the quality of both the
lawyer's exercise of independent professional judgment and the
* Associate Professor of Law, City University of New York (CUNY) School of Law. I
would like to thank Professor Peggy Cooper Davis for introducing me to the multiple intel-
ligences concept, and for her encouraging and helpful comments and suggestions on early
drafts of this paper. Thanks are also in order to (former Dean) Daan Braveman of Syra-
cuse University College of Law for material support for the early research on the paper, to
Arlene Kanter, Deborah Kenn, and Peter Joy for their comments and suggestions on early
drafts, and to all the students who participated in the Children's Rights and Family Law
Clinic during the 1998-2003 terms and who endured my pedagogical experiments with the
multiple lawyering intelligences paradigm, and who provided needed and useful feedback
and critiques of my efforts.
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choices made as a result of that process. The Article also suggests
some ways clinical teachers can use the lawyering intelligences frame-
work to more consciously and deliberately assist students in their de-
velopment of the divergent, complex, and morally-referenced
thinking involved in the exercise of independent professional
judgment.
I. INTRODUCTION
The ethical rules guiding lawyer-client relationships mandate that
lawyers exercise "independent professional judgment" in representing
clients.' In accordance with the dominant view of the lawyer's role,
the profession's ethical norms specify that lawyers provide clients
"with an informed understanding of the client's legal rights and obli-
gations" and explain the practical implications or those rights and ob-
ligations. 2 Along with this deeply embedded and preeminent
emphasis on legal rights in the ethical rules governing lawyer conduct,
there is also a recognition (albeit a sort of off-handed one) of the law's
inseparability from practical, moral, and ethical concerns inherent in
the realities of human conflict situations. Authorizing the lawyer to
refer to concerns such as "moral, economic, social and political fac-
tors" when advising a client, 3 the Comment to Rule 2.1 notes that be-
cause such concerns "may decisively influence how the law is
applied," advice premised entirely upon a technical interpretation of
legal rules "may be of little value to a client."' 4 In light of the rules'
discretionary stance regarding issues other than those of a specifically
legal character, on-going exploration about the extent to which law-
yers should engage clients in such discussions, and approaches they
might adopt in doing so, fills the literature. 5
1 "In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment
and render candid advice." AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT, R. 2.1 (2003) (Advisor) (hereinafter MODEL RULES).
2 Id., pmbl. sec. 2.
3 "In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations
such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client's
situation." Id., R. 2.1.
4 "Advice couched in narrow legal terms may be of little value to a client, especially
where practical considerations, such as cost or effects on other people, are predominant.
Purely technical legal advice, therefore, can sometimes be inadequate. It is proper for a
lawyer to refer to relevant moral and ethical considerations in giving advice. Although a
lawyer is not a moral advisor as such, moral and ethical considerations impinge upon most
legal questions and may decisively influence how the law will be applied." Id., Comment
to R. 2.1.
5 See, e.g, John M. Burman, Advising Clients About Nonlegal Factors, 27-FEB WYo.
LAW 40 (2004); Larry 0. Natt Gant, II, Integration as Integrity: Postmodernism, Psychol-
ogy, and Religion on the Role of Moral Counseling in the Attorney-Client Relationship, 16
REGENT U. L. REV. 233 (2003/2004); Peter Margulies, "Who Are You To Tell Me That?":
Attorney-Client Deliberation Regarding Nonlegal Issues and the Interests of Nonclients, 68
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Despite the profession's reluctance to mandate that lawyers bring
non-doctrinal issues to the table when giving advice, it seems unlikely
that a lawyer fulfills her duty to provide a client with adequately in-
formed assessments of the strengths and weaknesses of alternatives,
and to provide reasoned opinions about the relative propriety of vari-
ous options if she has not factored both legal rules and relevant con-
textual considerations into her deliberative calculus.6 Given the
prevalence of influences other than rights, powers, and obligations de-
rived from formal legal rules, the notion that lawyer's judgment can
be either truly "independent" or "professional" without reference to
the potential impact of social, cultural, and structural factors operating
within the situation appears untenable. 7
Indeed, the rules stress that such things as financial and relation-
ship interests often trump concerns rooted solely or primarily in legal
rights and powers: "[a]dvice couched in narrow legal terms may be of
little value to a client, especially where practical considerations, such
as cost or effects on other people are predominant."" The lawyer
therefore acts more consistently with her professional role when she
brings to the client's attention the potential impact of the client's deci-
sion on other people, and when she engages in dialogue with a client
around issues of "the right thing to do" than when she fails to do so.
The practical realities of client situations more often than not justifia-
bly demand more of the lawyer than an assessment of legal permissi-
bility,9 and it is therefore, in the words of the Model Rules, "proper
for a lawyer to refer to relevant moral and ethical considerations in
giving advice." 10
N.C. L. REV. 213 (1990).
6 Peter Margulies defines "nonlegal" issues generally as "issues apart from the narrow
discussion of whether a client will prevail on a given legal point before a given tribunal and
what the client can do to maximize her chances of prevailing. Peter Margulies, Who Are
You to Tell Me That?: Attorney-Client Deliberation Regarding Nonlegal Issues and the Inter-
ests of Nonclients, 68 N.C. L. REV. 213, 214 n.3 (1990). A range of non-doctrinal factors
that may influence a given client's situation have been identified, and include social, cul-
tural, and structural considerations. See, e.g., id. (arguing that "lawyers have a professional
responsibility to counsel their clients on issues of morality, policy, and - in certain situa-
tions - psychology"); MODEL RULES, supra note 1 (moral, social, political); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 94(3) (2000) (moral, reputational, eco-
nomic, social, political, and business).
7 See generally Burman, supra note 5; Gant, supra note 5; Margulies, supra note 6.
8 MODEL RULES, supra note 1, cmt. para 2.
9 "Human disputes, problems, conflicts, transactions, or events, while often having le-
gal implications, most often involve a host of other concerns: intrapsychic (emotional),
interpersonal (social, including both familial and more instrumentalist relations, as in em-
ployment), economic, political, moral, and religious." Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Law-
yer as Problem-Solver and Third-Party Neutral: Creativity and Non-Partisanship in




In addition to non-doctrinal influences and concerns and interests
of third parties, lawyers have an obligation to consider the ramifica-
tions of their judgments on others beyond clients and potentially af-
fected third parties. Membership in the legal profession imposes upon
lawyers duties inuring not only to the benefit of clients, but to the
legal system and the public interest as well. Each lawyer is a "repre-
sentative of clients, an officer of the legal system, and a public citizen
having special responsibility for the quality of justice."11 In accordance
with this caretaking obligation, the expectation of the profession is
that lawyers will act "in conformance with justice, fairness, and moral-
ity" by counseling clients to take non-doctrinal considerations into ac-
count "when the client makes decisions or engages in conduct that
may have an adverse effect on other individuals or on society," as well
as when functioning as an agent for clients.12 When lawyers do not
account for social, cultural, and structural influences in their decision-
making processes, cumulatively, and over time, decisions made and
actions taken in contemplation of lawyers' judgments can and do re-
sult in a variety of negative consequences to clients, to non-clients,
and to the quality of justice. 13
Given its highly discretionary nature and inextricable entwine-
ment with notions of morality, ethics, and justice, the exercise of inde-
pendent professional judgment has substantial normative content. As
the Model Rules point out, legal practice is fraught with "many diffi-
cult issues of professional discretion" which "must be resolved
through the exercise of sensitive professional and moral judgment.' 14
The often competing responsibilities of lawyers to clients, third par-
ties, and the public demand much more of the lawyer than mastery of
technical and interpretive complexities of reasoning and analysis re-
quired to understand the legality of alternative courses of action.
These obligations demand that the lawyer appreciate and integrate a
broad range of influences, concerns, and interests into her deliberative
11 Id., pmbl. para. 1 (emphasis added.)
12 ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, LEGAL EDU-
CATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM (REPORT OF
THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP) 213
(1992) [hereinafter "MACCRATE REPORT" ].
13 See generally DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE
LEGAL PROFESSION (2000); WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF
LAWYERS' ETHICS (1998); see also Nancy Rappoport, Seeing the Forest and the Trees: The
Proper Role of the Bankruptcy Attorney, 70 IND. L. J. 783, 783-84 (1995) (surmising that
the public's hostility toward lawyers may be partly attributable to a sense that lawyers are
just "hired guns" who fail to consider the long-term implications of how their strategies
affect society, and that "lawyers who further shortsighted, individual focused goals are im-
posing a real cost on society by not taking a more holistic approach").
14 MODEL RULES, supra note 1, pmbl. para. 9.
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process as she prepares to counsel and advise her clients. Noticeably,
the rules of professional responsibility do not provide specific gui-
dance to assist lawyers in this complex undertaking. As a result, some
have argued, lawyers do not sufficiently consider or counsel clients
with respect to non-doctrinal issues and the interests of third parties,
with the result that "[e]veryday, lawyers and clients make decisions
that do violence to others and create harshness and suffering, through
the assertion of positions sanctioned by law."'15
To date, the legal academy as a whole has done little to foster
good judgment in its students. Indeed, law schools lag behind medi-
cal, architectural, and business schools where educators "have deliber-
ately set out to teach judgment and artistry."' 16 And even though
clinical legal education holds special promise within the academy for
moving students beyond a purely rule-normed, individual-centered,
instrumentalist view of lawyering, 17 we are nevertheless reluctant to
embrace judgment as a specific learning objective. As Professor Mark
Aaronson points out, while "practical judgment.., is the key faculty
needed when lawyers seek to identify, assess, and propose concrete
solutions in particular and often complex social circumstances .... ex-
ercising judgment as a subject within clinical legal education is usually
something mentioned in passing, not something seriously explored."18
As clinicians charged with training new generations of lawyers, we are
in a unique position to minimize the violence, harshness, and suffering
created by decisions made by lawyers and clients without regard to
their larger social consequences. One of the ways we can ameliorate
this situation is by explicitly identifying the criteria and consciously
fostering the various intellectual capacities associated with indepen-
dent professional judgment.
Given its critical importance in legal decision-making and prob-
lem-solving, it is at first blush perplexing that clinical teachers are re-
luctant to name judgment as an explicit pedagogical focus. On further
contemplation, however, several reasons come easily to mind. For
one, it is likely that a good number of clinicians share the belief that
15 Mark Neal Aaronson, We Ask You To Consider: Learning About Practical Judgment
in Lawyering, 4 CLIN. L. REV. 247, 249 (1998).
16 Judith Welch Wegner, Lawyers, Learning, and Professionalism: Meditations on a
Theme, 43 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 191, 200-01 (1995).
17 See generally Jon Dubin, Clinical Design For Social Justice Imperatives, 51 SMU L.
REV. 1461 (1998); Linda Morton, Teaching Creative Problem Solving: A Paradigmatic Ap-
proach, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 375 (1998); Katherine R. Kruse, Biting Off What They Can
Chew: Strategies For Involving Students In Problem-Solving Beyond Individual Client Rep-
resentation, 8 CLIN. L. REV. 405 (2002); Andrea M. Seielstad, Community Building As A
Means of Teaching Creative, Cooperative, And Complex Problem Solving in Clinical Legal
Education, 8 CLIN. L. REV. 445 (2002).
18 Aaronson, supra note 15, at 249.
Fall 20041
CLINICAL LAW REVIEW
good judgment is an innate character trait: either you have it or you
don't, and it therefore cannot be taught. 19 On the other hand, while
some may be guardedly optimistic that judgment can be taught or at
least fostered, there is the epistemological problem: we may "know it
when we see it," but we do not know how to describe good judgment
in a way that is easily conveyed to students.
Some clinicians probably subscribe to at least one of these no-
tions about teaching judgment, and I am sure other rationales present
themselves to the reader's mind. I suspect, however, that a prime
cause of clinicians' reluctance to teach judgment is that we lack a suffi-
ciently precise language for talking about the diverse intelligences that
are integral to the exercise of this complex quality. I propose that we
can dramatically improve our students' ability to appreciate the range
of intelligences called into play in making the complex normative
choices required of lawyers in exercising independent professional
judgment. With a conceptual model and vocabulary for talking about
the criteria and standards associated with good judgment, we can
more consciously develop methods and techniques to nurture our stu-
dents' ability to reason about and make choices that are responsive to
the particularities of clients' situations and are morally and ethically
sound, and attuned to the broader social ramifications of those
choices. 20 In short, the basic premise of this Article is that naming and
understanding the intellectual capacities associated with lawyers' work
can increase our comfort level with the idea that judgment can be nur-
tured. With this greater comfort level, we will be more inclined to
design our courses to incorporate the exercise of independent, socially
responsible judgment as an explicit pedagogical goal.
To some, "[i]t is a commonplace that good judgment is the most
valuable thing a lawyer has to offer clients - more valuable than legal
learning or skillful analysis of doctrine. '21 It therefore seems impera-
tive that law schools take seriously the need to understand and teach
students about what it means to exercise socially responsible and ethi-
cal professional judgment.2 2 To assist in that endeavor, Part III of this
19 See, e.g,, Wegner, supra note 16, at 200 (asking why legal educators "do not set goals
of teaching sound "judgment", and of striving for "artful" or "wise" exercise of such judg-
ment?" and answering that "[p]erhaps law professors believe that judgment, artistry, and
wisdom cannot be taught, or that we have no time for the endeavor, striving as we do to
emphasize the rigors of analytical thought").
20 See, e.g., Alex Scherr, Lawyers and Decisions: A Model of Practical Judgment, 47
VILL. L. REV. 161, 277 (2002) (observing that "we may not be able to teach practical judg-
ment, at least not fully, although we can talk about it, and suggest ways to guide what we
do when we exercise it").
21 David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times,
9 GEO. J. LEG. ETHICS 31, 31 (1995).
22 DEBORAH RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE 186 (1999) ("Any serious commit-
[Vol. 11:15
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Article elaborates the concept of "multiple lawyering intelligences," a
framework and vocabulary designed to enhance our understanding of
and ability to nurture in our students the various intellectual and af-
fective capacities associated with sound lawyer judgment. To provide
a context for the description of the lawyering intelligences and their
relationship to lawyer judgment, Part II will briefly outline some of
the criteria identified by clinical scholars and others as crucial to
sound lawyer judgment, and will note the detrimental effects of the
conventional law school pedagogy on students' ability to exercise in-
dependent professional judgment. With this brief outline in place,
particular criteria identified as essential to sound lawyer judgment will
be taken up in more detail within the context of the discussion of each
of the lawyering intelligences.
II. WHAT IS INVOLVED IN THE EXERCISE OF INDEPENDENT
PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT?
Comprising a range of qualities such as soundness, logic, discrimi-
nation, discernment, imagination, sympathy, detachment, impartiality,
and integrity "[j]udgment is one of the most difficult topics to explore
and to theorize about. '23
However, we are not without guidance in trying to understand
the complexities and nuances of this important lawyering quality.
Drawing on a range of sources in jurisprudence, legal ethics, philoso-
phy, and the social sciences, Mark Aaronson has developed perhaps
the most comprehensive and accessible description to date of the cri-
teria and dynamics associated with good lawyering.2 4 According to
Aaronson, the principal function of judgment in the legal context "is
ment to improvements in the practice of law and the regulation of lawyers must start in law
school .... Law schools should equip their graduates with legal knowledge, legal skills, and
above all, legal judgment. Students should acquire the habits of mind and ethical values
that will serve the public in the pursuit of justice."); see also Henry Rose, Law Schools
Should Be About Justice Too, 40 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 443, 445 (1992) (asserting that "[lI]egal
education should not be about ideology. But it should be about transmitting to students
clear notions of what is expected of the 'good lawyer' as embodied by applicable codes of
ethics and each law school's vision of professionalism").
23 Aaronson, supra note 15, at 273.
24 In developing his ideas about judgment, Aaronson relies on a range of contemporary
and ancient sources including Dean Anthony T. Kronman, Karl Llewellyn, Aristotle, Im-
manuel Kant, Hannah Arendt, and Ronald Beiner. I caution the reader that my treatment
here does not reflect the depth and nuance of his work. In my opinion Aaronson's sus-
tained treatment of what he calls "the overlapping domains of good lawyering - role
conceptualization, problem solving, decision making, and practical judgment" is required
reading for those wishing to learn more about the criteria and dynamics of lawyer decision-
making and judgment from a clinical legal education perspective. In addition to his 1998
article, We Ask You To Consider, supra note 15, see also Mark Neal Aaronson, Thinking
Like a Fox: Four Overlapping Domains of Good Lawyering, 9 CLIN. L. REV. 1 (2002).
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to invoke and apply knowledge responsively when there are compet-
ing concerns and discrete decisions" to be made.25 It "is the key
faculty needed when lawyers seek to identify, assess, and propose
concrete solutions in particular and often complex social circum-
stances." 26
In these complex circumstances, "the expectation is that there is
not likely to be a set, technical approach to follow to reach a solution
nor necessarily a single determinant answer to resolve the matter.
27
In these decision contexts, good lawyer judgment is marked by a num-
ber of particularly salient characteristics, which include: (1) attention
to a wide range of contextual information along legal, personal, social,
and structural dimensions; (2) respect for and conscientious considera-
tion of the perspectives of a variety of relevant persons and entities in
addition to those of the client; (3) the ability to alternate between em-
pathy and impartiality with respect to the client's desires; (4) apprecia-
tion of and commitment to moral values such as fairness, equity, and
justice; (5) critical and imaginative action-oriented thinking; and (6)
the ability to learn from experience. Working together, these qualities
and abilities support what Aaronson describes as the defining charac-
teristic of good judgment: "a highly developed talent for identifying
and weighing competing considerations comprehensively and respon-
sively."'28 In the next Part, I point out some ways in which linguistic,
categorizing, logical-mathematical, narrative, interpersonal, intraper-
sonal, and strategizing intelligences are implicated in the exercise of
independent professional judgment.
In comparison to this complex mix of capacities, conventional law
school pedagogy focuses almost exclusively on linguistic, categoriza-
tion, and de-contextualized logical reasoning abilities. Not coinciden-
tally, these privileged capacities are also those most highly valued in
the argumentative, adversarial aspects of lawyers' work. 29 Even
though there is widespread agreement that the approaches to conflict
resolution reflected in the prevalent image of lawyer as "gladiator" or
"hired gun" does not adequately respond to the actual needs of clients
25 Aaronson, supra note 15, at 264.
26 Id. at 249.
27 Id. at 257.
28 Aaronson, Thinking Like A Fox, supra note 24, at 37.
29 See generally Alan M. Lerner, Law & Lawyering In The Workplace: Building Better
Lawyers By Teaching Students To Exercise Critical Judgment As Creative Problem Solver,
32 AKRON L. REV. 107 (1999); Howard Lesnick, Infinity in a Grain of Sand: The World of
Law and Lawyering As Portrayed In The Clinical Teaching Implicit In The Law School, 37
UCLA L. REV. 1157 (1990); Susan P. Sturm, From Gladiators to Problem-Solvers: Con-
necting Conversations about Women, the Academy, and the Legal Profession, 4 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL'Y 119, 134 (1997).
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and of society,30 law schools nevertheless continue to emphasize this
particular narrow band of intellectual abilities, thereby inculcating in
students a default orientation toward a conception of lawyering
grounded in a "win at all costs" mentality. This neglects interper-
sonal, intrapersonal, strategic, and narrative ways of knowing and rea-
soning that tend to feature prominently in lawyer functions such as
advocate, planner, negotiator, mediator, and counselor.
Anthropologist and law professor Elizabeth Mertz provides com-
pelling evidence that the faculty of judgment is a major casualty of
what she calls the "dynamic process of socialization into the legal pro-
fession. ' '31 Using the tools of linguistic anthropology to investigate
the linguistic patterns and discourse conventions in a cross-section of
first year classrooms across America, Mertz convincingly demon-
strates that the first year socialization process to which the majority of
law students are subjected is one in which "increasingly instrumental
and technical appeals to legal authority blunt moral and contextual
judgment. '32 Meticulously recounting and analyzing actual classroom
exchanges, Mertz points out how law professors control the dialogue
in a way that "pulls students away from grounded moral judgment and
fully contextualized consideration of human conflict. '33 In Mertz's ac-
count, this "decontextualized orientation" directs students' attention
away from the narrative elements of character, plot, and context -
"the drama of the conflict itself" - and towards substantive and pro-
cedural sources of legal authority.34 This orientation toward legal pre-
30 See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Winning Isn't Everything: The Lawyer
As Problem Solver, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905 (2002).
31 Elizabeth Mertz, Teaching Lawyers the Language of Law: Legal and Anthropological
Translations, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 91, 91 (2000).
32 Id. at 114. See also Lerner, supra note 29, at 109 (suggesting that "the focus in law
school on teaching students to 'think like lawyers' almost exclusively through the analysis
of appellate court opinions, while effectively developing students' analytical skills, tough-
ness, quickness, and the like, interfere[s] with the students' learning many other qualities
that we have observed in good lawyers, in particular, critical judgment and problem
solving").
33 Mertz, supra note 31, at 106 (asserting that some students come to experience a
sense of alienation as a consequence of the overly "objective approach to human conduct"
which "eras[es] many of the concrete social and contextual features of human conflict and
direct[s] attention away from grounded moral understandings, which some critics believe
to be crucial to achieving justice .... [A]s a result, the alienation experienced by some law
students during legal training may be an unavoidable consequence of a process in which
increasingly instrumental and technical appeals to legal authority blunt moral and contex-
tual judgment").
34 Id. at 101. Mertz identifies these sources of authority as the relationship of the text
under scrutiny with previously decided cases, the procedural history of the case, and "the
related strategic questions involving framing legal arguments within this authoritative
backdrop." Id. In illustration of her point, she describes an interchange in which the pro-
fessor focuses the student on categorizing work, repeatedly urging the student to "place
any 'facts' concerning the conflict story of the case within the framework of the relevant
Fall 20041
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cedent and legal procedure forces "students to suspend, at least
temporarily, their judgments about the emotional or moral character
of events. '35 Lerner has similarly remarked on legal education's parti-
ality to amoral and de-contextualized problem solving and the result-
ing detrimental effects on students' ability to exercise "critical
judgment. "36
In light of the firmly entrenched epistemological and pedagogical
stance of legal education that prioritizes highly decontextualized, ab-
stract logical reasoning over the kind of highly particularized, morally
referenced decision-making required for independent professional
judgment, the need for a powerful antidote to the conventional
pedagogy is imperative. To that end, in the next Part, I elaborate the
Workways multiple lawyering intelligences, an innovative framework
conceived as part of a multidisciplinary project dedicated to the design
and testing of curricular interventions. The project members seek to
develop counterbalancing frameworks and methodologies to counter-
balance legal education's persistent neglect of the range of intellectual
capacities with which lawyers perceive and respond to the complex
human concerns implicated in legal problems. 37
The central value of the lawyering intelligences framework lies in
its expansive conceptualization of the various capacities involved in
legal work. Extrapolating from the insight previously expressed by
my Workways colleagues that virtually all legal work "require[s] nar-
rative, interpersonal, intrapersonal, and strategic intelligences in equal
precedential legal categories instead of focusing on morality or narrative structure." Id. at
102.
35 Id.
36 Lerner offers an instructive account of his experience (along with colleague Susan
Sturm) of teaching a course focusing on the exercise of critical judgment which was de-
signed to counteract the tendency of students to focus only on legal rules and authority in
addressing legal problems. Based on his observations and student responses to the course
assignments, Lerner concluded that law schools should offer opportunities for students "to
exercise critical judgment and to operate in the problem solving paradigm in the first year
of law school." Lerner, supra note 29, at 125. In arriving at this conclusion, Lerner ob-
served that:
When confronted with a problem in law school, the students were inclined to ask
what hoops the professor wanted them to jump through rather than to examine the
problem from the client's perspective and consider how best to solve it using their
considerable analytical and creative powers.... This experience reinforced our con-
cerns that our students needed something more than what they were getting in law
school if they were to become the quality lawyers that their clients and their commu-
nities need. It also pointed out how quickly the students had absorbed several im-
plicit messages from their first semester: (1) legal disputes are resolved in litigation;
(2) their role is to figure out, working alone, how to "win" disputes in litigation; and
(3) when faced with a question from a person in a position of power to figure out
what the questioner wants to hear and answer accordingly.
Id.
37 See description of Workways at http://www.law.nyu.edu/workways/index.html.
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measure with categorizing and deductive reasoning, ' 38 my main thesis
in this paper is that greater consciousness of the ways in which these
capacities support the exercise of good judgment will enable us to
work more systematically and methodically to nurture students' abil-
ity to make ethical, socially responsible lawyering choices.
III. THE WORKWAYS LAWYERING INTELLIGENCES
The lawyering intelligences model is a product of the collabora-
tive efforts of Workways, a group of law professors, social scientists,
and education specialists devoted to the study of the varieties of work
necessary to effective and socially responsible lawyering.39 Primarily
the brainchild of Workways' founder Peggy Cooper Davis,40 the
model comprises logical-mathematical, linguistic, narrative, interper-
sonal, intrapersonal, categorizing, and strategic intelligences, a set of
distinct yet interconnected intellectual capacities that animate every
kind of legal work.41 The conceptual framework of the lawyering in-
telligences model is a domain-specific adaptation of Howard Gard-
ner's theory of multiple intelligences (also known as "MI theory"), 42
38 Sarah Berger, Angela Olivia Burton, Peggy Cooper Davis, Elizabeth Ehrenfest Ste-
inglass & Robert Levy, "HEY! THERE'S LADIES HERE!" Reflections on: Becoming
Gentlemen: Women, Law School, and Institutional Change by Lani Guinier, Michelle Fine,
and Jane Balin, Women in Legal Education: A Comparison of the Law School Performance
and Law School Experiences of Women and Men by Linda F. Wightman, Law School Ad-
mission Council What Difference Does Difference Make?: The Challenge for Legal Educa-
tion by Elizabeth Mertz with Wamucii Njogu and Susan Gooding, Cultivating Intelligence:
Power, Law, and the Politics of Teaching by Louise Harmon and Deborah W. Post, 73
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1022, 1061 (1998).
39 Workways is a multidisciplinary group of scholars devoted to study of the varieties of
work necessary to effective and socially responsible lawyering and to the design of pedago-
gies that will foster balanced development of those varieties of intellectual work. See
Workways website, supra note 37.
40 Professor Davis is the John Shad Professor of Lawyering and Ethics, and Director of
the Lawyering Program, New York University School of Law. See Davis homepage at
http://www.law.nyu.edu/davisp/index.html.
41 "For several years, [Workways has] worked collaboratively to name, understand,
learn, and develop the workways of lawyering. In our research, we have isolated logical-
mathematical, interpersonal, intrapersonal, narrative, categorizing, and strategic intelli-
gences, and found that each of them is important to doing every kind of lawyering work."
Berger et al., supra note 38, at 1061. While the conceptualization of lawyering work in
terms of multiple intelligences is primarily attributable to Professor Davis, the descriptive
content set out here is the product of my experience working with the model in the clinical
setting and of my canvass of the literature on lawyering and lawyering theory.
42 HOWARD GARDNER, FRAMES OF MIND: THE THEORY OF MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES
(10th Anniversary ed., 1993) (hereinafter FRAMES). In FRAMES, first published in 1983,
Gardner challenged the traditionalist view of intelligence as a single, immutable, general
intellectual faculty that can be measured through the assessment of logical-mathematical
and linguistic abilities. While the Workways lawyering intelligences is drawn from observa-
tions about what lawyers actually do and how they think in practice, Gardner's taxonomy
is based on criteria developed with reference to his scientific observation and investigation
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which defines "intelligence" in terms of specific intellectual frames -
for example, linguistic, logical, interpersonal or intrapersonal -
through which information is processed "in a cultural setting to solve
problems or create products that are of value a culture. ' 43 MI theory
posits effective problem solving or intelligent behavior as arising from
the interaction among numerous forms of intelligence, rather than
from the operation of a single unitary faculty. Similarly, while parsing
out the mental activities underlying the problem solving work of law-
yers, the Workways lawyering intelligences model recognizes that,
more often than not, these capacities work synergistically within any
given lawyering activity in an infinite variety of combinations, and to-
ward different ends.
Starting from the foundation provided by the Workways law-
yering intelligences model, this Article seeks to elaborate our under-
standing of each of the intelligences and the ways in which they are
implicated in lawyering work in general, and in the exercise of judg-
ment in particular. The descriptions proposed here are necessarily
partial, as it would be impossible to explicate the multitude of ways in
which the intelligences manifest in lawyers' work. The following dis-
cussion is framed with a primary focus on the lawyers' exercise of in-
dependent professional judgment in the context of counseling and
advising clients. As an orienting theme, it will be helpful to keep in
mind the insightful observations of Alan Lerner, which echo Aaron-
son's description of the multi-faceted and complex dimensions of
thought and action associated with sound lawyering judgment:
into a variety of sources including: knowledge about normal development and develop-
ment in gifted individuals; information about the breakdown of cognitive skills under con-
ditions of brain damage; studies of exceptional populations, including prodigies, idiots
savants, and autistic children; data about the evolution of cognition over the millennia;
cross-cultural accounts of cognition; psychometric studies, including examinations of corre-
lations among tests; and psychological training studies, particularly measures of transfer
and generalization across tasks. Id. at 59-70; see also HOWARD GARDNER, INTELLIGENCE
REFRAMED: MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES FOR THE 2 1ST CENTURY 41-66 (1999) (hereinafter
INTELLIGENCE REFRAMED). Gardner's original list included seven intelligences - logical-
mathematical, linguistic, interpersonal, intrapersonal, musical, bodily-kinesthetic, and spa-
tial; in recent times he has considered the case for three additional intelligences - natural-
ist, spiritual and existential. Id. at 41-66. In debunking the conventional notion of
intelligence as a quality measured solely by logical-mathematical reasoning and linguistic
ability, Gardner's theory revolutionized educational philosophy, and has served as a
springboard for educational reform across the world. A recent search of the internet using
the key words "multiple intelligences theory" turned up over 19,000 listings. For a partial
list of written and video works that have appeared about the theory of multiple intelli-
gences since 1983, and of contacts on multiple intelligences theory and its applications see
id. at 249-83 (Appendices B through D). Along with other leading theorists, including
Jerome Bruner, Carol Gilligan and Claude Steele, Gardner has served as a source of gui-
dance and advice for the Workways research agenda. Workways website, supra note 37.
43 GARDNER, INTELLIGENCE REFRAMED, supra note 42, at 33-34.
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To exercise critical judgment lawyers need to analyze the law criti-
cally, question the theory on which it rests, and challenge the appro-
priateness of its application. They need to gather analyze, and
synthesize information from a variety of sources and disciplines,
while understanding that each source has its own perspective. They
need to recognize and deal with ambiguity. They need to communi-
cate effectively, orally and in writing with people as different from
each other and themselves as clients, government officials, judges,
jurors and experts in various fields. In today's multi-cultural "global
village" lawyers will need to engage in difficult discussions about
complex and contentious issues such as the law's relationship to
matters of race, culture, and gender. Further, because so much of
being an effective lawyer is learned through experience and reflec-
tion, they need to apply the same critical skills that they apply to a
problem brought to them by a client in order to examine their work
as lawyers. 44
A. Linguistic Intelligence
Sensitivity to the spoken and written word, facility with different
languages, and the ability to use language pragmatically are some of
the general characteristics of linguistic intelligence. 45 Gardner identi-
fies four primary functions of language that have "proved of striking
importance in human society," which are also particularly relevant to
lawyering work: the rhetorical aspect - "the ability to use language to
convince other individuals of a course of action;" the mnemonic po-
tential - "the capacity to use [language] to help one remember infor-
mation;" the explanatory aspect; and "the ability to use language to
reflect upon language, to engage in 'metalinguistic' analysis. '46 For
the lawyer, these aspects of language are crucial to every kind of law-
yering activity.
Clarity, logical organization, precision, and conciseness are fun-
damental principles of effective legal writing.47 Over the last three
decades, the trend in legal writing has been away from the unnecessa-
rily convoluted and dense style characteristic of earlier times, toward
44 Lerner, supra note 29, at 111-12.
45 See generally GARDNER, FRAMES, supra note 42, at 73-77 (identifying grammar and
pragmatics as the core operations of language, with grammar focusing on the internal
structure of language, including the meanings and connotations of words, phrases, and
sentences (semantics); the ordering of words (syntax); and the pronunciation of words
(phonology), while pragmatics involves how we use language to communicate meaning and
influence others to think, believe, feel, and act).
46 GARDNER, FRAMES, supra note 42, at 78.
47 See, e.g., VEDA R. CHARROW, MYRA K. ERHARDT & ROBERT P. CHARROW, CLEAR
AND EFFECrIVE LEGAL WRITING 1 (3d ed. 2001) ("The rules of good expository writing




the use of "plain language" in all kinds of legal writing.4s While atten-
tion to principles of clarity, precision, and plain language contribute
greatly to the effectiveness of legal writing in its function of transmit-
ting and receiving information, for the lawyer-as-professional writer,
facility with both the communicative and pragmatic aspects of lan-
guage is indispensable.
The study of language is divided between grammar, or the study
of the internal structure of language, and pragmatics, or the study of
how language is used to communicate. 49 Concerned as it is with the
way we use language to do things, the pragmatic function of language
is of particular interest with respect to the exercise of lawyer judg-
ment. The beginning of judgment is problem-identification, and to
recognize that our choice of language - the words we use to describe a
problem, person, or event - is to appreciate that alternative conceptu-
alizations, and therefore, alternative choices, are possible. 50 To the
extent that we must use words to describe or define the problem, our
choice of language "frame[s] the questions open for debate or for
consideration. '51
In the ill structured settings in which most lawyering decisions are
made, framing the problem is the first step in the process of generat-
ing potential solutions. 52 Our choice of language can greatly influence
the way we and others view the world; those choices can either open
up or close off consideration of potential solutions, and impact how
we think about the desirability, feasibility, and propriety of different
courses of action.53
Our choice of language also serves to bring us closer to, or to
distance us from, the humanity and viewpoints of others.54 Moreover,
48 RICHARD C. WYDICK, PLAIN ENGLISH FOR LAWYERS 4 (4th ed. 1998).
49 See, e.g., FRANK PARKER, LINGUISTICS FOR NON-LINGUISTS 11 (1986).
50 See, e.g., ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 166
(2000).
51 Id.
52 See, e.g., STEFAN H. KRIEGER & RICHARD K. NEUMANN, ESSENTIAL LAWYERING
SKILLS: INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING, NEGOTIATION, AND PERSUASIVE FACT ANALYSIS 27
(2d ed. 2003) (identifying problem-identification as the first step in a six-step process of
diagnosis, prediction, and strategizing; see also Aaronson, supra note 15, at 257 (noting
that in ill-structured problem settings "[t]he place to begin to define the problem is usually
not clear and "the goals to be sought are frequently subject to debate and refinement").
53 "Issues arise when choices are possible and when the need to make them is per-
ceived. Language can foreclose the logical possibility of certain choices or conceal the
need to make them." AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 50, at 181.
54 "Our image of the characters who seem to us central to any set of events will affect
the story that we discern in those events and the issues posed by the events for judgment or
decision." Id. at 187. See also Mertz, supra note 31, at 106-09 (describing ways in which
"human characters in the conflict story become strategizing skeletons, defined by legally
delimited contexts, shaped by their places in ongoing dialogic arguments" as law professors
compel students, through the use of "abstraction to distance themselves from the human
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the terms we use to describe people involved in legal situations are
often freighted with stereotypical images and evocative of unwar-
ranted assumptions and inferences.55 Because these assumptions can
operate to affect our own responses and actions, and those of other
people in ways more or less predictable, we need to "choose our
words with attention to the possibility that alternative, contending
views may be taken of what is happening or should happen. '56
Understanding the ways in which language "poses, defines, struc-
tures, and connects (or isolates) issues and the ways in which language
averts, blurs, prompts, and conceals issues" is essential to good law-
yering judgment. Sensitivity to the potential implications of our lan-
guage choices for others, as well as to the ways in which our own
understandings, beliefs, and attitudes are manifest in those choices is
critical to good lawyer judgment.
B. Categorizing Intelligence
Categorization occurs when we order or classify concepts, people,
things or events on the basis of significant generalizations or on pat-
terns of difference and similarity.57 Some cognitive psychologists sug-
gest that our inclination to categorize and stereotype is an inherent
aspect of the way we process information and assign meaning to expe-
dimensions of their client's problems").
55 See generally Jane B. Baron, Language Matters, 34 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 163
(2000) (reflecting on "the way in which language matters, how we use and abuse stereo-
types, and, most of all, the liberatory potential of understanding that language and stereo-
types (and so much else) are social constructions"); Kathryn M. Stanchi, Resistance is
Futile: How Legal Writing Pedagogy Contributes to the Laws Marginalization of Outsider
Voices, 103 DICK. L. REV. 7 (1998) (asserting that "language has the power to regulate
human social relations in subtle ways that are difficult to see" and exploring the ways in
which legal writing pedagogy contributes to the marginalization of outsider voices). See
also Jane Aiken, Provocateurs for Justice, 7 CLIN. L. REV., 287, 298-300 (2001) (describing
law guardian's negative reaction to the use of the word "Mom" to describe clinic's female
client who was formerly a male and the father of the child involved in a custody dispute,
and noting that the "paradigmatic assumption" that a child cannot have two biological
parents was operating in the situation).
56 Id.
57 AMSTERDAM & BRUNER define a category as "a set of things or creatures or events
or actions (or whatever) treated as if they were, for the purposes at hand, similar or
equivalent or somehow substitutable for each other." AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note
50, at 20. GARDNER'S "naturalist intelligence," framed in terms of the ability to recognize
and classify species in nature, is essentially concerned with the general ability to recognize
important aspects of one's environment and to appropriately categorize or classify those
phenomena on the basis of relevant similarities and distinctions. GARDNER, INTELLI-
GENCE REFRAMED, supra note 42, at 48-52. GARDNER recognizes this when he notes that
"it seems reasonable to assume that a naturalist's capacities can be brought to bear on
artificial items ... Thus, it is possible that the pattern-recognizing talents of artists, poets,
social scientists, and natural scientists are all built on the fundamental perceptual skills of
naturalist intelligence." Id. at 49-50.
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rience.5 8 Amsterdam & Bruner identify a number of functions of cat-
egorizing that relate to legal categorization, including: (1) mental
economy, which allows us "to treat things as if they were the same as
what we had encountered before; ' 59 (2) pragmatic utility - that is, the
use of categories to "do some job to pursue some interest; ' 60 (3) refer-
ence group relevance, which referes to the notion that "our categories
are grounded in conceptions of what matters to ourselves and those on
whom we depend.., the people with whom we feel interdependent in
the conduct of life;"' 61 (4) communal power - shared category systems
function to create and promote communal solidarity and cultural co-
hesion;62 (5) personal gratification - that is, we use categories "to
serve our personal needs and quirks" to classify aspects of our percep-
tions, as manifest in categorizations such as "suspicious-looking peo-
ple;"' 63 and, finally, (6) risk regulation - the use of categories to guard
against risk by minimizing error or optimizing utility, for instance.64
In the legal domain, the basic categorization process consists of a
deductive process which Amsterdam calls a FARF analysis.65 In this
"fact-and-rule-fit" process, new sets of facts or stories are connected
with legal precedent by focusing on narrowly parsed aspects of the
conflict stories as delineated by previously determined circumstantial
specifications which, when satisfied, lead to a particular outcome. 66
The process of fitting specific facts within categorical constructs is cen-
tral to the inductive, deductive, and analogical reasoning processes
typically involved in legal analysis and legal reasoning, and as such,
categorization choices significantly affect the outcomes of legal
58 STEVEN WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST 101 (2001).
59 AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 50, at 21.
60 Id. at 22.
61 Id. at 23.
62 Id. at 24-25.
63 Id. at 25.
64 Id. at 26.
65 Peggy Cooper Davis & Elizabeth Ehrenfest Steinglass, A Dialogue About Socratic
Teaching, 23 REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 249, 265 (1997); see also AMSTERDAM & BRUNER,
supra note 50, at 42-48 (distinguishing common model of categorizing from categorizing by
"prototyping" or by reference to "implicit praxic knowledge" or "folk psychology" con-
sisting of familiar narratives and scripts).
66 As described by Davis & Steinglass:
The first step in a FARF analysis is to cull from an appellate opinion (1) the facts of
the matter before the court, and (2) the rule of law that has been applied. The rule is
parsed into a definitional component (prescribing the circumstances under which the
rule attaches) and an outcome component (prescribing the result once the rule at-
taches). FARFing consists of establishing the fit between the facts of the matter and
the definitional component of the rule, so as to justify the result prescribed by the
rule's outcome component. It is understood as a deductive process: The rule says that
if X happens, Y will be the consequence. X has happened; therefore, Y.




An "an act of meaning making, ' 67 legal categorization relies on a
process of abstraction and generalization that "eras[es] many of the
concrete social and contextual features of human conflict" that "can
direct attention away from grounded moral understandings, which
some critics believe to be crucial to achieving justice. '68 It commonly
requires that the people involved in a legal dispute be defined solely
or primarily by their argumentative positions within a litigation con-
text and their legally defined identities (e.g., "defendant," "plaintiff,"
"custodial" or "non-custodial parent," "biological stranger"). Nota-
bly, "this step out of social context ... can conceal the ways in which
law participates in and supports unjust aspects" of the political and
economic structure of society.6 9 Furthermore, legal categorization
"hid[es] the ways that legal approaches exclude from systematic con-
sideration the very details and contexts that many would deem impor-
tant for moral assessments. ' 70 Thus, while serving the purpose of
narrowing the pool of "facts" considered relevant to a particular legal
outcome, categorizing, as typically used in legal thinking, tends to cir-
cumscribe rather than enlarge possible resolutions to a legal problem.
As Amsterdam & Bruner tell us:
Once we put a creature, thing, or situation in a category, we will
attribute to it the features of that category and fail to see the fea-
tures of it that don't fit. We will miss the opportunities that might
have existed in all the alternative categories we did not use. We will
see distinctions where there may be no differences and ignore dif-
ferences because we fail to see the distinctions.
7 1
In other words, "[l]aw defines categorically the limits of the permissi-
ble or, more often, the impermissible. 72
Given the strictures of classroom discourse, it is not surprising
that most students, when they even notice that categorization moves
67 "To put something in a category is to assign it a meaning, to place it in a particular
context of ideas." AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 50, at 28.
68 Mertz, supra note 31, at 105. Describing the way students are indoctrinated into the
process of abstracting the "relevant" facts, Mertz says:
In order to connect each new conflict story with legal precedent, students must focus
on detailed aspects of the stories, in order to categorize the new facts as instances of
general, legally-specified types. For example, a student would argue that a particular
act or event in this new conflict story constitutes a breach of contract because it is
arguably the "same" as an action or an event in a previous case where the courts
found a breach. Yet, this apparent concern for specificity wrenches detail from its
particular social and narrative context in ways that can obscure or erase the features
of the story to which lay people look when reaching moral judgments. Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 50, at 49.
72 Id. at 8.
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are being made in judicial opinions, typically view the process simply
as an exercise of definition-matching, in which the facts of the case at
hand are matched with the terms set out in a doctrinal rule. A more
nuanced view of categorization will allow them to understand that cat-
egories are created; how they are created; and the function that a cate-
gory serves in a particular case.73 Amsterdam & Bruner note a variety
of methods we use to create categories - for instance, by "assimilating
the thing-to-be-categorized to a prototype rather than by comparing
its observed attributes with a checklist of definitional components," 74
or by relying on "implicit praxic knowledge" in the form of shared and
familiar stories ("narratives" and "scripts") about "what-you-are-sup-
posed-to-do" in particular situations or how things are supposed to
work and "what happens when a script is thrown off track or
threatened with derailment. '75 Armed with this knowledge, students
will come to realize that "categories are made, not found. '76
Consciousness of the process of categorization can allow our stu-
dents to engage in more sophisticated critique of judicial opinions and
to make more conscious and deliberate categorization choices in their
own reasoning processes. With a deeper understanding of the dynam-
ics of categorization, students will start to realize that the categories
selected and used by legal actors, including themselves, inevitably em-
body choices of values, priorities, and norms,77 whether consciously or
not, and that those choices then determine, to a large degree, what
"facts" matter to the determination of probable or desirable out-
comes.78 Thus, students' ability to creatively imagine alternative out-
comes for their clients starts with the ability to unearth hidden
assumptions and identify fallacious or erroneous factual premises un-
derlying categorical choices. Once students understand this basic
truth, they will be in a better position to choose and rebut underlying
premises, to select or create alternative categorizations, which lead to
different syllogisms and ultimately, different outcomes, thereby ex-
panding the possible options available to clients.79
73 Id. at 61.
74 Id. at 43.
75 Id. at 44-48.
76 Id. at 27.
77 WINTER, supra note 58, at 101.
78 See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 50, at 20. The authors use two Supreme
Court decisions, Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995) and Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491
U.S. 110 (1989), to illuminate the kinds of categorizing moves judges make within judicial
opinions, how they are accomplished, and what functions categories serve within the larger
movement of the opinion. Id. at 54-109.
79 See Catherine Pierce Wells, Situated Decisionmaking, 63 CAL. L. REv. 1727, 1731
(1990) (contrasting the "highly structured procedure of investigation and interpretation"




Generally, logical-mathematical intelligence involves the ability
to think abstractly, to analyze problems logically, to carry out mathe-
matical operations, and to investigate issues scientifically. 80 Lawyers
use this mode of thinking in developing and analyzing legal argu-
ments, drawing inferences and conclusions from facts or premises, and
in recognizing fallacies within a set of facts. Although a variety of
logical processes may be usefully employed in legal problem-solving, 81
legal education typically emphasizes inductive, deductive and analogi-
cal forms of reasoning. 82 Reasoning from specific instances to create
general principles - inductive reasoning - involves comparison of dif-
ferences and similarities in fact situations to discern or create general
legal rules and overarching principles of decision.83 Reasoning from a
general legal precept to specific facts to justify a legal outcome - de-
ductive reasoning - is employed when the general rule is then applied
to a new case. Analogical reasoning involves noting similarities and
differences in sets of facts, and is foundational to both inductive and
deductive reasoning processes. 84 The ability to marshal related facts
and order them so that general concepts can be applied, and to under-
stand and interpret opinions, regulations, and statutes relies heavily
on the ability to engage in deductive, inductive, and analogical
processes.
When advising and counseling clients about alternative ways of
resolving their problematic situations, the syllogistic and paradigmatic
mode of reasoning is crucial for developing an adequate understand-
more contextual exploration of the case" which "recreates the case as an individual narra-
tive that requires an outcome satisfactory to our sense of justice in this particular context,"
and prods "sound intuitive recommendations" concerning resolution of the matter. In the
first case, legal structure and deductive reasoning is foregrounded, whereas the narrative
turn "brings background to the foreground" by focusing directly upon "the facts of the case
as they are experienced by the participants").
80 See generally GARDNER, FRAMES, supra note 42, at 128-69.
81 See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education - a 21st Century Perspec-
tive, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 612, 614-15 (1984) (identifying ends-means thinking, hypothesis
formulation and testing, and contingency planning).
82 For a detailed discussion of the various forms of legal reasoning see generally RuG-
GERO J. ALDISERT, LOGIC FOR LAWYERS: A GUIDE TO CLEAR LEGAL THINKING 45-113
(3d ed. 1997) (providing detailed explanation of deductive and inductive reasoning); see
also LINDA H. EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING AND ANALYSIS 55-62 (2003) (identifying rule
based, analogical, policy-based, principle-based, custom-based, and narrative forms of
reasoning).
83 See generally ALDISERT, supra note 82, at 89-115.
84 See, e.g., ALDISERT, supra note 82, at 93 (describing analogy as "reasoning from the
particular to the particular" and noting its close relations to inductive reasoning, or "rea-
soning from the particular to the general"); Edwards, supra note 82, at 56 ("The most
common variety of analogical reasoning justifies a result by making direct factual compari-
sons between the facts of prior cases and the facts of the client's situation.").
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ing of how application of legal doctrine to the relevant facts may af-
fect the available options. Framed primarily in terms of what Jerome
Bruner calls "paradigmatic thinking," typical legal argument "at-
tempts to fulfill the ideal of a formal, mathematical system of descrip-
tion and explanation. '85  The logical-mathematical intelligence,
therefore, is crucial to many aspects of lawyering ranging from client
counseling to appellate argument.
Certainly lawyers need a well-developed ability to engage with
the logical processes described above to understand the legal land-
scape that may influence the possible courses of action available to a
client in a given situation. Of course, legal rules need not restrain
courses of action not contemplated by the law, but it is axiomatic that
a lawyer's judgments will be made in the shadow of the law. 86
D. Narrative Intelligence
Viewed by some psychologists as a fundamental category of un-
derstanding, 87 narrative intelligence refers to our apparently inherent
propensity to interpret and construct stories so as to make sense of
events, circumstances, and situations.8 8 Lawyers draw on their narra-
tive ability across a variety of lawyering functions such as interviewing
and counseling, negotiation, case theory development, and doctrinal
analysis. 89
Too often obscured by intense focus on legal rules, storytelling
suffuses the work of lawyers. Indeed, the law is only meaningful in
relation to some situation or factual circumstance: "[t]o the extent
85 KRIEGER & NEUMANN, supra note 52, at 133, quoting JEROME BRUNER, ACTUAL
MINDS, POSSIBLE WORLDS 12 (1986).
86 See generally Scherr, supra note 20, at 253-61 (discussing the ways in which law influ-
ences lawyering choices and decisions).
87 Some theorists suggest that our propensity to make meaning of experience through
storytelling may well be an innate and universal human competence. See, e.g., AMSTER-
DAM & BRUNER, supra note 50, at 115 (summarizing theories of narrative and noting that
the central claim of endogenous theories of narrative is typically that "narrative is inherent
either in the nature of the human mind, in the nature of language, or in those supposed
programs alleged to run our nervous systems").
88 Beginning law students often exhibit this propensity. Mertz noted that, in response
to a request to "start developing for us the arguments for the plaintiff and the defendant,
law students instinctively "begin by concentrating on the drama of the conflict itself" by
starting to tell the story of the events in questions, typically responding "through the lens
of a traditional semantic reading, one focused on character, plot, and content." Mertz,
supra note 31, at 102.
89 See, e.g., KRIEGER & NEUMANN, supra note 52, at 129-36 (2d ed. 2003); Binny Miller,
Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative in Case Theory, 93 MICH. L.
REV. 485 (1994). For a brief but detailed summary of the role of narrative from initial
client interview through appeal in the litigation context, see Sally Frank, Eve Was Right To
Eat The "Apple": The Importance Of Narrative In The Art Of Lawyering, 8 YALE J. L. &
FEMINISM 79, 85-88 (1996).
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that law is fact-contingent, it is inescapably rooted in narrative." 90
Certainly stories serve the elemental purpose of describing "what
happened." But they also have substantial persuasive power arising
from their potential to evoke both intellectual and emotional re-
sponses: "stories give comfort, inspire, provide insight, they forewarn,
betray, reveal, legitimize, convince." 91
The narrative mode of thinking takes on particular relevance in
the process of judgment. Whereas a focus on logical-mathematical
thinking in law school encourages students to think about legal prob-
lem-solving primarily with reference to legal texts and legal author-
ity,92 narrative thinking takes a more capacious approach, structuring
facts in the context of stories rather than in the context of legal rules,
in an attempt to discover or demonstrate the meaning of the
situation.93
Lawyering judgment is enhanced by "substantial contextual aware-
ness and highly inclusive deliberation. '94 Legal disputes cannot be
fully understood without reference to the particular circumstances and
lived experiences of the people involved and to the larger environ-
90 AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 50, at 110. The authors amplify the nexus be-
tween narrative and law as follows:
Law lives on narrative, for reasons both banal and deep. For one, the law is awash in
storytelling. Clients tell stories to lawyers, who must figure out what to make of
what they hear. As clients and lawyers talk, the client's story gets recast into plights
and prospects, plots and pilgrimages into possible worlds. If circumstances warrant,
the lawyers retell their clients' stories in the form of pleas and arguments to judges
and testimony to juries. Next, judges and jurors tell the stories to themselves or to
each other in the form of instructions, deliberations, a verdict, a set of findings, or an
opinion. And then it is the turn of journalists, commentators, and critics. This end-
less telling and retelling, casting and recasting is essential to the conduct of the law.
It is how law's actors comprehend whatever series of events they make the subject of
their legal actions. It is how they try to make their actions comprehensible again
within some larger series of events they take to constitute the legal system and the
culture that sustains it.
Id.
91 Id. at 115; see also Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements,
63 U. CHI. L. Rav. 361 (1996) (exploring victim impact statements as a kind of story that
evokes powerful emotions at the sentencing stage of a trial).
92 See, e.g., Mertz, supra note 31, at 101. Mertz notes that the emphasis on placing the
"facts" concerning the conflict story of the case into legal categories instead of focusing on
morality or narrative structure "requires students to suspend, at least temporarily, their
judgments about the emotional or moral character of events. Thus, whether someone was
right or wrong, moral or immoral, reprehensible or ethical is not an issue in this pragmatic
reading." Id. at 102.
93 See, e.g., KRIEGER & NEUMANN, supra note 52, at 133-36, 155-70 (identifying narra-
tive mode of thinking about facts and describing the "story model of organizing facts," with
instructions on how to "organize and present facts to endow them with a meaning that
supports your client's case").
94 Aaronson, supra note 15, at 257.
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ment within which the conflict has developed. 95 Unlike legal categori-
cal reasoning, narrative reasoning permits of a range of contextual
factors, including "moral, political, sociological, philosophical, psy-
chological, or jurisprudential" considerations, and is thus an important
tool for lawyers in assessing potential options for client decision and
action.96 In comparison to judges writing appellate judicial opinions
who may not be "particularly interested in the material/social interac-
tions and positioning of the parties that lead up to lawsuits or the ma-
terial/social consequences of decisions after they are rendered," 97 the
exercise of independent professional judgment requires a sensitivity to
the network of personal and structural circumstances in which real
disputes are embedded.
To effectively hear, tell, and write stories, lawyers should become
familiar with the general elements that make a good narrative. A
story is marked by a "focus[ ] on a central character, the protagonist,
who is faced with a dilemma; the dilemma develops into a crisis; the
crisis builds through a series of complications to a climax; in the cli-
max, the crisis is solved."' 98 In short, a story is "an account of a char-
95 See, e.g,. Regina Austin, "Bad For Business": Contextual Analysis, Race Discrimina-
tion, And Fast Food, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 207 (2000) (using contextual analysis and
ethnographic methods to critically examine law as it relates to low-wage, low-status minor-
ity service workers).
96 Aaronson, supra note 15, at 250. Alex Scherr sheds further light on this important
subject by articulating various legal and non-legal "topics," that lawyers must assess as a
foundation for imagining and evaluating possible plans of action or options for resolving a
client's problematic situation. Scherr, supra note 20, at 221-22. Scherr discusses narrative,
emotion, relationships, power, money, interests, and difference as the non-legal realities,
or external and internal factors that lawyers need to take into account in shaping their
judgments and decisions. Id. at 218-51. According to Scherr, these are the influences,
along with law, which "produce[ ] possible plans of action, which embody both means
(whether and how to use dispute resolution process, when and with what style to pursue
settlement, what formal structures to use for transactions) and ends (what remedies to
seek, what interests to stress, what relationships to foster and structure"). Id. at 221.
97 Id. at 207.
98 Brian J. Foley & Ruth Anne Robbins, Fiction 101: A Primer For Lawyers On How
To Use Fiction Writing Techniques To Write Persuasive Facts Sections, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 459,
466 (2001). Amsterdam's and Bruner's "austere definition of narrative" elaborates on this
thematic:
A narrative can purport to be either a fiction or a real account of events; it does not
have to specify which. It needs a cast of human-like characters, beings capable of
willing their own actions, forming intentions, holding beliefs, having feelings. It also
needs a plot with a beginning, a middle, and an end, in which particular characters
are involved in particular events. The unfolding of the plot requires (implicitly or
explicitly): (1) an initial steady state grounded in the legitimate ordinariness of things
(2) that gets disrupted by a trouble consisting of circumstances attributable to human
agency or susceptible to change by human intervention, (3) in turn evoking efforts at
redress or transformation, which succeed or fail, (4) so that the old steady state is
restored or a new (transformed) steady state is created, (5) and the story concludes
by drawing the then-and-there of the tale that has been told into the here-and-now of
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acter running into conflict, and the conflict being resolved." 99 The
general topics in narrative include "character, conflict, resolution, or-
ganization (plot), point-of-view [perspective], setting, voice, style,
description, and word choice." 100 Drawing on the insight that "[w]hat
lawyers call 'thinking through a course of action' is a narrative projec-
tion of the perils of embarking on one pilgrimage or another," 10 1 the
use of narrative imagination enhances judgment by focusing attention
on the roles that character, context, plot, conflict and resolution play
in arriving at a richly contextualized appreciation of the client's lived
experience and her interactions and connections with other people in
her world.102
While conventional legal education "pushes students to direct
their attention toward textual and legal authority, casting aside issues
of 'right' and 'wrong,' of emotion and empathy - the very feelings
most likely to draw the hearts of lay readers as they encounter tales of
human conflict,"11 3 narrative thinking specifically embraces these fac-
ets of human reaction and judgment. Thinking in narrative terms can
prompt students to consider "both the big picture and the particular
details of the client's situation," including "the likely viewpoints and
concerns of different participants, whether they [are] clients, potential
allies, adversaries, or decision makers."'01 4 Moreover, focusing on the
element of "character" highlights that the "facts" of a case are not
limited to "what happened," but include the client's relationships with
other people who may be relevant in the client's world, as well as the
thoughts, feelings, perceptions, attitudes, expectations, hopes and
fears of the client and others.
Narrative thinking is also a useful tool for imagining alternative
courses of action that might not otherwise occur if the focus is only on
possibilities proscribed within available legal categories. 10 5 The narra-
tive form is uniquely suited to the justice-referenced goal analysis re-
the telling through some coda - say, for example, Aesop's characteristic moral of the
story.
AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 50, at 113-14 (emphasis in original).
99 Foley & Robbins, supra note 98, at 466. The authors identify character, conflict,
resolution, organization and point-of-view as "the most important elements for lawyers,"
id., noting that "[v]oice and style are largely dictated by the conventions of legal writing,
and description boils down to a matter of emphasis - how, or how much a writer describes
an event or person. Word choice pervades all other elements: what we call something goes
a long way toward what or how a reader will think of that thing." Id.
100 Id.
101 AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 50, at 110.
102 See generally KRIEGER & NEUMANN, supra note 52, at 155-70.
103 Mertz, supra note 31, at 99.
104 Aaronson, supra note 15, at 252.
105 See generally Miller, supra note 89.
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quired for the exercise of independent professional judgment.10 6
James Boyd White says that lawyers' work demands "a capacity to
envision different versions of the future" through "a social and narra-
tive imagination .... The lawyer must be able to tell himself imagi-
nary stories about the future." 10 7
Judgment is about choice and decisions, and involves opinions,
evaluations, and values. If our "pedagogical goal is not so much to
teach students judgment explicitly, as it is to enlarge their awareness
and appreciation of the kinds of considerations, whether they be
moral, political, sociological, philosophical, psychological or jurispru-
dential, that shape a lawyers' sense of judgment," 10 8 then narrative
thinking is a useful entry point into thinking and talking about the
specific mental operations, personal behaviors, and ethical and moral
considerations involved in the exercise of independent professional
judgment and about the lawyer's role as public citizen with a special
responsibility for the quality of justice. Thus, the importance of a
strong narrative sensitivity and imagination emerges as a prominent
capacity in judgment.
E. The Personal Intelligences: Intrapersonal and Interpersonal
The personal intelligences - interpersonal and intrapersonal -
shape our understanding of ourselves and others. Sensitivity to issues
of personality, motivation, belief, and values is essential to effective
interaction and communication, and these issues are inextricably im-
plicated in the process of defining and solving legal problems.10 9
"How one listens, talks and acts affects the identification and gather-
ing of information and one's ultimate persuasiveness and effectiveness
106 "Narrative certainly provides a cognitive frame for the data which decision-makers
(clients or otherwise) need to reach a final decisions .... Narrative provides a tissue of
language through which decision-makers can discern the certainty necessary for decision.
More assertively, narrative moves decision-makers towards the actions that will flow from
their decisions." Scherr, supra note 20, at 231.
107 JAMES BOYD WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 208-09 (abridged ed. 1985).
108 Aaronson, supra note 15, at 250.
109 See generally Stephen Feldman & Kent Wilson, The Value of Interpersonal Skills in
Lawyering, 5 LAW & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 311 (1981) (reporting on a study designed to
explore the relative roles of legal competency and relational skills as factors in client satis-
faction with the attorney-client relationship and finding that relational skill had a signifi-
cantly positive affect on how the attorney was perceived by a client). See also Lawrence
Grosberg, Should We Test for Interpersonal Skills? The Value of Interpersonal Skills in
Lawyering, 3 CLIN. L. REV. 349 (1996); Marjorie Silver, Emotional Intelligence and Legal
Education, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & LAW 1173 (1999); Ian Weinstein, Testing Multiple
Intelligences: Comparing Evaluation By Simulation and Written Exam, 8 CLIN. L. REV. 247
(2001) (arguing that written exams are not adequate assessment tools for law schools be-
cause they cannot test capacities such as interpersonal and intrapersonal intelligences, and
suggesting that a combination of simulation and written exams may be more useful in as-
sessing students' aptitude for lawyering).
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as a problem solver." 110 Lawyers need to learn how to relate well to
people. This requires knowing oneself and an appreciation of how
others' experiences, values, and expectations may differ from one's
own."1 I Thus, the quality of legal work, including the exercise of inde-
pendent professional judgment, is enhanced by heightened sensitivity
to the intrapersonal and interpersonal dimensions of lawyering.
1. Intrapersonal Intelligence
Intrapersonal intelligence refers to the ability to distinguish and
respond to our own feelings, needs, desires, and motivations, to build
accurate mental models of ourselves, and to use these mental models
to guide us in making important decisions about our lives.112 While
"emotional sensitivity" is integral to the development of intrapersonal
intelligence, it is in how a person uses self-knowledge for personal and
professional problem-solving that the full measure of intrapersonal in-
telligence is actualized. 113
Lawyers do not leave their beliefs, cultural norms, and personal
values at the door when they assume the roles of counselor, advisor,
advocate, planner, judge or legislator. It is therefore important that
we notice and monitor how our beliefs, norms, and values tend to af-
fect our attitudes and interactions in lawyering work.114 For example,
lawyers are said to be, as a group, risk adverse. Such a predisposition
regarding risk can lead the lawyer to overvalue certain alternatives for
clients while undervaluing others, even though the client may not be
so risk adverse as the lawyer. As a counselor, part of the lawyer's job
is to assist a client in making a decision that makes sense in terms of
the client's - and not the lawyer's - disposition toward risk.1 1 5
Beyond the impact that a lawyer's own beliefs, attitudes, and val-
110 Aaronson, supra note 15, at 253.
111 Id.
112 GARDNER, INTELLIGENCE REFRAMED, supra note 42, at 43.
113 Id. at 43, 200. Gardner distinguishes intrapersonal intelligence from what he calls
"emotional sensitivity," noting that while "emotions do accompany cognition," intraper-
sonal intelligence concerns a type of cognition that helps us make sense of ourselves and
others through emotional sensitivity. Id. at 43.
114 See generally Susan Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cross-Cultural Competence in
Lawyers, 8 CLIN. L. REV. 33 (2001) (describing a process designed to increase lawyers'
cross-cultural competence); Michelle Jacobs, People from the Footnotes: The Missing Ele-
ment in Client-Centered Counseling, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 345 (1997) (examining
the ways in which lawyers' unconscious racism and cultural bias may impact the attorney-
client relationship and suggesting that clinical law professors integrate self-awareness train-
ing into their clinical courses).
115 See, e.g., Paul Brest & Linda Krieger, On Teaching Professional Judgment, 69 WASH.
L. REV. 527, 550 (1994) (describing the role of "utility function" or a person's attitude




ues may have in terms of individual client decision-making, the law-
yer's role as "public citizen" with "special responsibility for the quality
of justice" 116 magnifies the importance of intrapersonal sensitivity. As
members of a self-regulated profession that encourages the public's
faith in lawyers, lawyers have a high level of individual discretion with
regard to ethical decision-making. 117 Without the ability to identify
one's own morals, values, and beliefs, recognizing and resolving ethi-
cal dilemmas will be difficult, if not impossible. While rules and codes
of professional responsibility provide general standards of conduct,
the integrity of the legal system depends ultimately on each individual
lawyer's independent judgment as to how to conform her behavior to
the rules. Further, because the rules often do not provide specific gui-
dance, the lawyers must in many cases be guided by their own sense of
right and wrong in making decisions about their conduct within the
law.
2. Interpersonal Intelligence
Interpersonal intelligence denotes "a person's capacity to under-
stand the intentions, motivations, and desires of other people and,
consequently, to use this knowledge effectively in dealing with
others."118 Virtually all legal work is relational: it is something we do
with words, with our minds, and with each other. 119 Sensitivity to the
social milieu in which we operate is therefore integral to the work that
lawyers do on behalf of clients as we interact with colleagues, deci-
sion-makers, and other actors in the legal system.
The personal intelligences are inextricably intertwined.
"[K]nowledge of one's own person perennially [is] dependent upon
the ability to apply lessons learned from the observations of other
people, while knowledge of others draws upon the internal discrimina-
tions the individual routinely makes. '120 A person, including a law-
116 MODEL RULES, supra note 1, pmbl, para. 1.
117 The Preamble to the MODEL RULES notes that:
In the nature of law practice, however, conflicting responsibilities are encountered.
Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict between a lawyer's respon-
sibilities to clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer's own interest in remaining
an ethical person while earning a satisfactory living. The Rules of Professional Con-
duct often prescribe terms for resolving such conflicts. Within the framework of
these Rules, however, many difficult issues of professional discretion can arise. Such
issues must be resolved through the exercise of sensitive professional and moral
judgment guided by the basic principles underlying the Rules.
Id., para. 9.
118 GARDNER, INTELLIGENCE REFRAMED, supra note 42, at 43.
119 JAMES BOYD WHITE: HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORICS AND POETICS OF
LAW 49 (1985).
120 GARDNER, FRAMES OF MIND, supra note 42, at 241.
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yer, who fails to fully understand the feelings, the responses, and the
behavior of others, is likely to interact inappropriately with others. 121
Judgment is "the process by which we take into account relevant
information and values, and then determine what ought to take prior-
ity in a particular context. ' '122 Thus, judgment is not merely a matter
of collecting information and deciding what to do. It involves how we
perceive, think, and know, as well as our moral attitudes about right
and wrong; it involves careful thinking and deliberation as well as a
willingness to recommend or take decisive action.123 Thus, the ethical
mandate to provide clients with independent professional judgment is
not fulfilled by simply figuring out how to get the client what he or she
wants; it involves the more complex process of using a broad base of
knowledge to weigh all the available information, including the values,
preferences, and sensibilities of others to arrive at informed opinions
regarding alternative courses of action that will best facilitate both a
legal and a just outcome.
Arriving at such an opinion requires the ability to navigate be-
tween empathetic connection with, and impartial detachment from
one's client. While, on the one hand, empathy involves "heightened
sensitivity to the interpersonal dynamics of human relationships" and
an "understand[ing] of [one's] own predilections and biases as well as
trying to understand someone else's, ' 124 detachment involves "[t]he
ability to see things from someone else's perspective without necessa-
rily sharing or endorsing that viewpoint or concern.' 25 The ability to
distance oneself from the client's perspective allows for a "survey [of]
alternatives from shifting vantage points and [the ability to] to raise
pertinent concerns that are not immediately obvious,"' 26 and is what
guides us in weighing personal and structural considerations such as
"race, ethnicity, gender, religion, poverty, wealth, imbalances of
power, organizational interests, economic motives, psychological
needs, and so on."'127 Detachment allows us to "step back and decide
what really needs to be acknowledged and what does not . ...
[C]ritically considering the ideas of others is a first step in identifying
what is most relevant and likely to be decisive in a set of
circumstances. "1 2 8
In sum, this "double distancing" of empathy and detachment re-
121 Id. at 254.
122 Aaronson, supra note 15, at 262.
123 Id. at 256.
124 Id. at 269.






quires a capacity to identify the viewpoints of others, and to then step
back and evaluate those viewpoints in relation to each. It requires as
well the ability to step back from one's own viewpoint. The notion of
lawyer as a moral agent who responsibly exercises discretion in ethical
decision-making and judgment envisions a "social being[ I whose exis-
tence is grounded in relationships with others."'1 29 By focusing stu-
dents on this aspect of the lawyer's role we "can assist [them] to
understand and answer better the ethical and moral questions which
members of the legal profession face as they promote the reconcilia-
tion of differences within society. ' '130
F. Strategic Intelligence
Part of the "essential logic of lawyering," 131 strategic intelligence
is important across a variety of lawyering tasks: from generating an
overall plan of action for the conduct of a complex litigation to devel-
oping a legal research plan; from planning a client or witness interview
to preparing for a negotiation. A strategy can be simply defined as a
careful plan or method devised to accomplish a goal.1 32 Lawyers call
on their strategic intelligence when they imagine, generate and evalu-
ate alternative plans for reaching a desired end, and make choices
about the most effective course of action. It is forward looking, con-
cerned with exploring multiple scenarios, alternatives and options,
and. involves anticipating the potential consequences of various
courses of action and anticipating the behavior of the relevant actors
in the situation. Most accounts of the phases of strategic planning and
implementation include problem framing, gathering and evaluating in-
formation about the potentially relevant law and facts, including an
assessment of a broad range of possibly relevant interests, solution
generation, solution evaluation, decision, and action.133
Once a lawyer has gathered the information and used her narra-
tive, categorizing, and logical capacities to make sense of it all, the
task is then to generate as many feasible alternatives for helping the
client resolve the matter as possible given the inevitable time, re-
source, and energy constraints in any given decision situation. The
lawyer must weigh the pros and cons of each option, and work with
the client to prioritize the possibilities in terms of the likelihood that
each will satisfy the client's situational needs. Strategic planning can
129 Robert Araujo, S.J., The Virtuous Lawyer: Paradigm And Possibility, 50 SMU L.
REV. 433, 440 (1997).
130 Id.
131 Richard K. Neumann, On Strategy, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 299, 320 (1990).
132 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARYOF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(unabridged ed., 1993).
133 See, e.g., KRIEGER & NEUMANN, supra note 52, at 27-28.
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be informed by a variety of approaches: ends-means thinking, hypoth-
esis formulation, information-acquisition analysis, contingency plan-
ning, and comparative risk evaluation. 134
"Judging for lawyers is a process of deliberation directly linked to
concrete action, '' 135 and strategic thinking is crucial to this process.
IV. CODA - FIRST PRINCIPLES: THINKING LIKE A LAWYER AND
STUDENT-CENTERED LEARNING
"Thinking like a lawyer" takes on different meaning depending
on the person, the context, and the purpose for which the lawyers'
thoughts are operating. Far too many law students internalize a nar-
row vision of law and lawyering, resulting in their inability to appreci-
ate the "complex interplay of information, experience, power and
culture" by which the exercise of independent professional judgment
is characterized. 136 Consequently, many incipient lawyers graduate
from law school with an image of themselves not as sources of author-
ity and "trustees of justice," 137 but as a mere instrument for obtaining
whatever lawful, although potentially amoral or immoral goals their
clients may desire. This narrow view of the lawyer's role permeates
the consciousness of law students early on and becomes more and
more resistant to change over time, leaving society with vast numbers
of lawyers who fail to appreciate or take seriously their role as public
citizen and promoter of social justice.
To counteract this tendency, the lawyering intelligences model si-
multaneously seeks to enlarge our vision of law and bring some mea-
sure of order and clarity to the complexities inherent in lawyering
activities by naming these essential lawyering capacities as a "first step
in bringing discipline to the process of developing intellectual capaci-
ties about which we have been inarticulate and neglectful." 138 With
134 Amsterdam, supra note 81, at 613-14.
135 Aaronson, supra note 15, at 267.
136 Aiken, supra note 55, at 292.
137 Id. at 288.
138 Workways Overview, http://www.law.nyu.edu/workways/workways.html (visited July
26, 2004). To engage students in the active learning process and to set the foundation for
introducing the lawyering'intelligences concept, at the beginning of the semester, I dis-
tribute a questionnaire which asks students, among other things, to describe their under-
standing of "intelligence," and to briefly describe their own intelligence profile. In
response to this inquiry, virtually all of the student responses evidence a multi-dimensional
rather than a unitary understanding of what it means to be intelligent. The following sam-
pling of responses reveals that students come to law school with a much more flexible, fluid
and broad view of intelligence than is embodied in the traditional law school epistemology:
Intelligence as a "broad concept ... not necessarily knowing factual things, but also
understanding the hows and whys of things. Intelligence can be seen in the way
people view, understand, process, and define situations and relationships.
Fall 2004]
CLINICAL LAW REVIEW
this expansion of our pedagogical vocabulary we can re-orient the way
we talk with our students about law, legal reasoning, and legal practice
toward a more inclusive, complex, and human-centered conception of
lawyer's work than is projected through the language of the conven-
tional pedagogy. Further, reference to the intelligences framework
can help us to develop and carry out our course, classroom, and super-
visory plans to include more explicit focus on developing sound
judgment.
In my own experience I have found that a multiple intelligences
approach to teaching and learning law reminds students of what they
already know: that lawyers' work involves more than fitting facts into
legal categories and predicting how a judge will most likely rule if a
case goes to court. A description of one way I have used the model
will serve as an illustration of this point. During a class session early
in the semester devoted to discussing the clinical experience and the
expectations for student participation, I ask students to identify "good
lawyer" and "bad lawyer" characteristics.' 39 Contemplation of the
I don't necessarily equate intelligence with "book" smarts or grade point averages. I
think intelligence is embodied in a global understanding of the world and the many
people and cultures that are within in it. I think intelligence is acquired by creating
the experiences and opportunities to learn about different things and people.
My understanding of intelligence is that there are often two levels: intelligence that
results from being book smart and intelligence that results from common sense.
Common sense intelligence is what is gained through experience, studying, practic-
ing, loving and living life whereas book intelligence revolves around study with a
lesser emphasis on life experiences. I like to believe that each person possesses their
own varying degrees or combinations of the two. Law school has shown me that I
possess common sense intelligence, and I like that better anyhow.
I believe intelligence comes in many forms. Ultimately, it depends on the situation
or the problem at hand. Everyone has strengths and weaknesses. It is the person
who has the ability to acquire knowledge and employ the skills to solve his/her
problems consistently and in a reasonable amount of time who is the most intelligent.
It is not necessarily the person who scored the highest on an IQ test.
As one insightful student summed up: "Intelligence is judgment, intuition, speed of under-
standing, depth of understanding, and a general ability to understand."
139 Some of the qualities and characteristics students have described include: good lis-
tener; good organizational skills; empathizes with people of diverse backgrounds; compas-
sionate ally; communication skills; prepares thoroughly; confident and strong advocate;
curious; honest; strikes balance between over-lawyering and under-lawyering; asks good
questions; ethical; takes care of self; patient; learns from others; seeks to understand the
motivation of clients; able to view problems/issues from a variety of perspectives; knowl-
edgeable about law and legal process; consults rules of professional responsibility; fierce
and determined to help clients; humble; maintains balance; self-less; diligent balances ag-
gressiveness with prudence; reflective; integrity; keeps client informed; self-directed
learner; continuously improves and updates; thinks "outside the box;" good oral and writ-
ten skills; desire to serve others; communicates well with others; exercises good judgment;
respectful; good analytical skill; hard worker; maintains relationships with family/friends;
can tell a good story; avoids self-destructive activities; seeks help for personal problems;
humane; intelligent; strong; knowledgeable about people and how they behave; exhibits
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sheer diversity and length of the list always seems to have a sobering
effect on the group. This exercise draws on the students' own knowl-
edge and perceptions of lawyering, and involves a shared discovery
experience in which students collaboratively construct a group frame-
work of lawyering as multi-faceted, complex, and ripe with potential
for social change and positive contributions to society. 140  It also
serves as a jumping off point for discussion with students of the notion
that the more conscious we are of the mental processes that underlie
our work, the more effective we can become at developing and using
them fully. 141 Additionally, access to a common vocabulary and
detached empathy; present focused; dedicated; assertive; anticipates consequences of ac-
tions/decision; consults with client; passionate.
140 Highlighting the social aspect of learning and cognition, sociocultural theorists sug-
gest that the development and use of a common vocabulary for group use around a partic-
ular learning activity can advance learners' ability to "negotiate meaning, build new
knowledge and restructure problems in terms of the perspective of another" by enforcing
intersubjectivity." Curtis Jay Bonk & Kyung A. Kim, Extending Sociocultural Theory To
Adult Learning, in ADULT LEARNING AND DEVELOPMENT: PERSPECTIVES FROM EDUCA-
TIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 71 (M. CECIL SMITH & THOMAS POURCHOT eds., 1998). The exercise
draws on students' prior knowledge, and emphasizes "dialogue, teacher co-learning, peer
collaboration, questioning, and joint knowledge construction." Id. at 69.
Reactions of students to the use of the lawyering intelligences framework for this pur-
pose provides anecdotal support for the proposition that having a common language with
which to talk about the range of lawyering intelligences encourages intersubjectivity. As
one student reported, the lawyering intelligences list encouraged her to participate in class
discussions more than she might have otherwise. In response to a mid-semester question-
naire inquiring into students' perception of the clinic experience generally, and the value of
the lawyering intelligences framework in particular, this student wrote that she had be-
come "more confident in expressing [her] ideas without fear of being laughed at or chas-
tised by colleagues and supervisors." Another student echoed those sentiments, writing
that she had become "willing to share more of [her] thoughts with others than [she had]
ever been before" in her life. Another student indicated the usefulness of the paradigm,
writing:
In such a small class, each student's presence and contributions are especially notice-
able and essential. This can be an issue for someone like me, whose aim thus far has
been to promote invisibility in law school classes. I do not have a fear of speaking
necessarily, but I generally try to keep quiet unless I feel that I have something bril-
liant to say. As that does not happen very often, I do not have a great track record in
the area of participation. However, because I know that my comments don't have to
be brilliant, and that a lot of thoughts that come to mind actually are "relevant," I
have made a sincere effort to contribute to discussions and answer questions.
(emphasis in the original). These and similar responses reinforce for me the idea that by
expanding the scope of issues and topic that are "legally relevant," the lawyering intelli-
gences framework not only enriches the classroom discourse but also encourages otherwise
reticent students to participate and contribute.
141 After we have pretty much exhausted the possibilities for the list (given the con-
straints of time), I distribute a handout with a condensed description of each of the law-
yering intelligences, something in the nature of a "crib sheet" for easy reference. Once
students have looked over the lawyering intelligences list and ask any questions about it,
we proceed to an exercise in categorization, in which students match items in the "good
lawyer" characteristics list with the lawyering intelligences outlined on the handout. As
the categories begin to flesh out, the lawyering intelligences framework emerges as a sche-
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framework for understanding helps students to engage more meaning-
fully in their own learning as they identify, reflect on, appreciate, prac-




Embodied in the Workways philosophy and approach is the no-
tion that legal education should facilitate students' understanding of
fundamental legal concepts and foster the development of intellectual
versatility and "a critical consciousness about their professional
role.' 1 43 To this end, the goal of this Article has been to elaborate the
Workways lawyering intelligences framework as an additional tool to
assist us in becoming "clearer about what strengths our students need
to develop and how those strengths will be integrated and used in
matic encompassing the "good lawyer" characteristics generated by the students, and I
explain that we will be using the framework as a reference vocabulary, as a diagnostic for
assessment of our strengths and weaknesses, and for monitoring and evaluating growth,
and as a frame of reference for noticing and appreciating diverse approaches to law and
lawyering and of multiple ways of working. I mention its genesis in Gardner's theory of
multiple intelligences, connecting the concept back to the inquiry on the student question-
naire about how they understand the concept of intelligence. Finally, I stress that the law-
yering intelligences framework is one approach among many that can aid our
understanding of what lawyers do and how they think in practice.
142 Another way that I have used the framework is as a tool for diagnosing learning
needs and developing learning objectives. Commenting on the importance of self-assess-
ment and the commitment to self-development, the MacCrate Report notes that: "The
responsibility for assessing one's fitness for any career must ultimately rest with the indi-
vidual, who through careful introspection can make judgments regarding personal
strengths, priorities, and other aptitudes and thereby maximize the likelihood of experienc-
ing a satisfying and rewarding professional life. This personal responsibility for self-assess-
ment in beginning one's self-development should continue through professional school and
throughout one's professional life." MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 225. The law-
yering intelligences model, together with the MacCrate Report, can serve as a relatively
comprehensive catalogue of tasks, skills, values, and intellectual capacities needed by legal
professionals. The following student comments suggest the value of the lawyering intelli-
gences framework as a tool for self-assessment and self-monitoring:
* I believe that I have made significant progress in developing professionalism and
self-directedness. I have made a conscious effort to become aware of my strengths
and weaknesses in the various lawyering intelligences and have tried to integrate
these strengths and weaknesses into my work.
" I have naturally been able to be self-directed and take the initiative regarding
tasks that need to be done. I have had a harder time taking the initiative when it
comes to interpersonal situations. My ability to do so is improving through my
interactions with my partner, my professor, and other clinic members.
" My ability to be self-reflective has grown considerably. I am willing to share more
of my thoughts and ideas with others than I have ever been before in my life. I
have come a long way in just one semester, but there is still much more growth
that can occur in these areas.
143 Berger et al., supra note 38, at 1062.
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practice. '144
Independent professional judgment is not only an essential aspect
of the lawyer-client relationship; it is also "mandatory rule of con-
duct,"'1 45 and lawyers must take into account issues of justice, fairness,
and morality in its exercise. Susan Sturm has argued that "[t]he law-
yer's claim to professionalism in the twenty-first century may well rest
on the capacity to bring together diverse skills and perspectives and to
facilitate informed judgment and constructive action."' 46 If that is
true, then it is imperative that we find ways to foster in students "a
broader conception of what a lawyer should be - a professional with a
wide range of particular skills but also a human being who exercises
judgment, cares for her fellow human beings, both clients and the
larger society and who has a vision of what professional work should
be that goes beyond litigation. '147
As a general rule, clinical teachers engage with students around
the narrative, interpersonal, intrapersonal, and strategic facets of law-
yering, as well as the linguistic, categorizing, and strategic aspects.
This article provides a vocabulary and framework that will allow us to
become more conscious of how these intellectual activities are impli-
cated in the exercise of judgment, and more articulate about the crite-
ria and internal dynamics of judgment associated with each. The hope
is that we will thus become better able to develop and gauge pedagog-
ical choices and interventions designed to enhance our students' abil-
ity to exercise ethical and socially responsible lawyering judgment.
144 Id. at 1061.
145 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING 23-4
(3d ed. 2001 & Supp. 2004-2).
146 Sturm, supra note 29, at 140.
147 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Narrowing the Gap By Narrowing the Field: What's Missing
from the MacCrate Report - Of Skills, Legal Science and Being a Human Being, 69 WASH.
L. REV. 593, 594 (1994).

